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Creati ng Hi stori cal  Identi ty  with Data  
A  D i g i t a l  P r o s o p o g r a p h y  P e r s p e c t i v e  
John B radley  
As someone who has worked throughout my career in the Digital Humanities (DH), I 
keep an eye on what is happening in Computer Science by regularly reading one of its 
major journals, the Communications of the ACM. While reading the recent April 2019 edi-
tion, I was surprised to find an article entitled “Identity by Any Other Name” (Helland, 
2019). Up to then, I had not noticed much interest in questions of what constituted 
identity in Computer Science. In that world, related words like identifier might well be 
invoked frequently in certain kinds of digital development work, but their significance 
beyond a rather basic, formal one seemed to be little considered. As it turns out, Hel-
land too is primarily interested in that part of identity that focuses on digital identifi-
ers, and is thinking about identity in the context of what he calls “complex multi-com-
pany e-commerce”, with much of the article exploring what happens to digital identity 
when material is shared between what Helland calls “intertwined systems” (p. 80). 
In contrast, identity is more likely to appear as an interesting topic for discus-
sion in the humanities, albeit from quite a different perspective: debates about 
“identity politics” perhaps provide a good example. For those in the humanities, I 
suspect that Helland’s discussion about identity would seem to be too narrowly and 
formally defined to be clearly related to their interests. Still, perhaps we can find 
things that bring the two quite different concerns more closely together by focusing 
on a perspective that arises out of the Digital Humanities, which always has to strug-
gle with reconciling the formal nature of computer representation with the nature of 
a humanities perspective. The Digital Humanities provides a kind of middle ground 
where at least some aspects of these two kinds of concerns can usefully meet. 
I started work in what we now call the Digital Humanities before it had that 
name, first at the University of Toronto starting in the 1970s, and then, since 1997 at 
King’s College London’s Department of Digital Humanities (DDH). At King’s, I was 
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involved (with responsibilities ranging from a junior technician to principal investi-
gator) in more than 20 projects that aimed to develop a digital representation of var-
ious humanities academic projects. Often the project work involved finding an ef-
fective balance between how our humanities colleagues felt an issue needed to be 
dealt with and what the technology made possible. Inevitably, sometimes questions 
about the handling of identity came up. 
Furthermore, although I was never going to be the right person to dig into things 
like identity politics, it turned out that the great majority of our projects could be 
categorised as historical and, thus, in at least that particular humanities domain. 
Hence, the digital representation work for these 20 projects obliged us all to think 
more than once about issues of a less politically hot topic related to identity: identity 
of historical entities, particularly persons. Many of these projects were, or had sig-
nificant components in, digital prosopography – which by its very nature is about 
the identification and thus the identity of historical persons – and were based on 
historical work covering quite a range of periods and cultures.1 In this paper, then, I 
intend to take up the identity issue from a digital history perspective, and by this I 
mean to explore issues that are in part rooted in a Computer Science perspective, 
and in part on the humanities historical one. 
T r a d i t i o n a l  P r o s o p o g r a p h y  
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines prosopography as “a study that identifies and 
relates a group of persons or characters within a particular historical or literary context”. 
Thus, for example, one of our prosopographical projects, the Prosopography of Anglo-
Saxon England, identifies historical people who appeared in Anglo-Saxon sources. Law-
rence Stone, in an article often cited when discussing prosopography, writes: 
Prosopography is the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of 
actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives. The method employed is to estab-
lish a universe to be studied, and then to ask a set of uniform questions – about birth and 
death, marriage and family, social origins and inherited economic position, place of resi-
dence, education, amount and source of personal wealth, occupation, religion, experience of 
office, and so on. The various types of information about the individuals in the universe are 
then juxtaposed and combined, and are examined for significant variables. (Stone, 1970, p. 46) 
                                                                          
1
  The eight projects in which I have been involved are described in Bradley 2016 on the associated web page 
entitled ‚Factoid Prosopographies at CCH/DDh KCL` at website https://factoid-dighum.kcl.ac.uk/factoid-pro
sopographies-at-cchddh-kcl/ (Access: June 15, 2021). 
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Stone does not specifically use the word “identity” here, but it is in the establishing 
of the individuals that make up the “group of actors” he describes that the issue of 
identifying them arises naturally, and it is interesting that these “uniform questions” 
that he says are often asked (birth, death, marriage, social origins, etc.) were often 
some of the central topics of interest to our digital prosopographies too. 
All of DDH’s digital prosopographies can trace their origins back to the pre-dig-
ital prosopographies developed primarily by British scholars in the mid-20th cen-
tury. Indeed, the first of DDH’s collaborative prosopographies, the Prosopography of 
the Byzantine Empire (PBE), which was initially published on a CD in 2001 but is now 
available online (Martindale et al., 2001 and 2015), was undertaken after the three 
volume Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (PLRE) which had been completed in 
1992, but had been started decades earlier under the leadership of the well-known 
British Late Antiquity scholar Arnold Hugh Martin (A.H.M) Jones. 
PBE, by virtue of being the first of DDH’s “digital prosopographies”, is something 
of a transitional project, with elements in its makeup that sit well within both an older, 
pre-digital, approach to prosopography inspired directly by the work of A.H.M Jones, 
but also in the approaches that were to come. Like all of DDH’s prosopographies (and, 
certainly, like many of the older pre-digital ones), it primarily consists of a collection 
of pieces of information about individuals that the historians have established existed 
in the time period the prosopography covers. In PBE, these historical individuals are 
identified using the same scheme that had worked in PLRE, via a name and a number 
(the number is used to differentiate all the individuals with the same name). Figure 1 
shows a typical entry for a randomly chosen individual Konstantinos 24: 
Each name-number combination asserts PBE’s view of the existence of a partic-
ular individual. However, obviously the name/number by itself is hardly an assertion 
about the existence of an individual that can be usefully used by others, or contested. 
Since the name/number by itself does not really provide an identity for this historical 
person, how does the rest of the entry manage it? 
Like all the individuals in PBE, this entry starts with a table of classification as-
sertions about the individual (note that many of these classification categories are 
those identified by Stone in his 1970 article, quoted above, as typical of the interests 
of prosopography). This provides more information that begins to define an identity 
for Konstantinos 24. However, I think it is arguable that the short article which follows 
– a narrative – which tells a kind of story about the individual is the thing that really 
establishes Konstantinos 24’s identity. It is based on material found in the historical 
sources, and represents PBE’s lead historian, John Martindale’s, summary of what 
the sources tell us about the individual. 
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Martindale’s previous prosopography, the print-based PLRE, also had an article for 
each identified person that is similar in style to those that appear in PBE, although 
PLRE does not have the preceding classification category data that we find in PBE. The 
fact that the article’s style in PBE is similar to PLRE is perhaps not surprising; Martin-
dale was one of the principal historians in PLRE, and it would be natural to think that 
because PBE was actually originally conceived of as a continuation of the work in PLRE, 
that the materials of interest to him, and therefore presented in the articles he wrote 
for individuals within PBE, would be similar. 
H i s t o r y  M a k i n g  a n d  N a r r a t i v e  
I would like to take a moment here to think a bit more about the role of the article in 
PBE and PLRE and how its production constitutes the work of “doing history”. First 
of all, as has already been noted, the articles can be thought of as short narratives 
that describe what can be deduced about the individual’s life. The assumption that 
this should be presented as a narrative is deeply rooted in historiography in general. 
Avril Cameron makes a connection between historical persons and narrative in an 
article in a monograph that celebrated the completion of PBE: 
Fig. 1: Konstantinos 24 in the Prosopography of the Byzantine World  
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History-writing is made out of all kinds of components, but information about individual per-
sons remains among the most important. A story without persons would not be history at all. 
And even a Marxist Historiography of class depends on persons to give it life. Prosopography 
– ’writing about individuals’, or ‘the recording of persons’ – is one methodology which gathers 
and digests information about the individual persons who are attested in a particular histori-
cal period; as well as uncovering specific careers and relationships, it may also provide a tool 
for the broader detection of historical trends. (Cameron, 2003, p. xiii) 
What is relevant here to the current paper is the observation, indeed assumption, 
that as a kind of history, prosopography is expressed through writing and is carried 
out through writing about individuals; about the creation of stories about persons. 
Cameron’s assumption that text is the main vehicle for presenting historical research 
is not uncommon. Indeed, we can spot a sense of discomfort for historians with ma-
terials other than text in the observation of the noted American historian David J. 
Bodenhamer that “Despite a flurry of interest in quantitative history in the 1960s and 
1970s, historians as a group have remained more comfortable with manuscripts than 
databases” (Bodenhamer, 2008, p. 220). See also Alfred Louch’s claim in an article 
about historiography in which he proposes “to examine the technique of narrative as 
it is used by historians, in order to show that it is not merely an incidental, stylistic 
feature of the historian’s craft, but essential to the business of historical explanation” 
(Louch, 1969, p. 54). 
We see in these articles views expressed about the place of narratives in history. I 
would like to claim that those in traditional prosopography would have assumed that 
the narratives that they wrote for their historical individuals were the way by which 
identities were given to the historical people the work identified. And, indeed, al-
though in the entries for people in PBE (of which the entry for Konstantinos 24 is an 
example), people are also classified according to schemes that PBE developed so that 
groups of kinds of individuals could be found (to locate, say, all Grammatikos); nonethe-
less it was the article that actually gives each people an historic identity. 
P e r s o n a l  I d e n t i t y  a n d  “ L i f e  S t o r i e s ”  
The connection between narrative and personal identity that appears to apply to tra-
ditional prosopography also seems to operate, at least in some practitioners’ minds, 
in another discipline that focuses on human behaviour: psychology. There one finds 
an interest in what is called Life Stories, where, according to its adherents, it provides 
the mechanisms by which individuals generate their own identities through the tell-
ing of stories about themselves. One of the major proponents of the psychology of 
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life stories is Dan McAdams who in a major review article of the field observed that 
“[a]s personality psychologists began to turn their attention to people’s lives, they 
found notions such as story and narrative to be especially useful in conveying the co-
herence and the meaning of lives” (McAdams, 2001, p. 100). Later, in the same review 
article, while talking about his own earlier writings, he writes: “In his life story model 
of identity, McAdams […] has argued that identity itself takes the form of a story, 
complete with setting, scenes, character, plot, and theme” (p. 101). Then he goes on 
to say that “Identity […] is an integrative configuration of self-in-the-adult-world” 
and that it operates both synchronically, integrating a broad range of different “and 
probably conflicting” characteristics, and diachronically (over time) to also reflect 
changes and developments (p. 102). McAdams’s interest is in an individual’s personal 
stories about his/her own personal development. 
McAdam has thus proposed that narratives or stories about persons are inter-
twined with their personal identity. From what we have seen concerning traditional 
prosopography, narrative and historic personal identity appears to be similarly in-
tertwined as well. Indeed, Stone’s very first sentence in his article about the histori-
cal method of prosopography states that prosopography (a term he claims is used by 
ancient historians) and “collective biography” (the term used by modern historians) 
refer to the same kind of historical methodology (cf. Stone, 1970, p. 46). The word 
“biography” surely refers to the creation of narratives to deliver the history. 
N a r r a t i v e  D i s a p p e a r s :  D a t a - O r i e n t e d  P r o s o p o g r a p h y  
Given the apparent connection between narrative and history provided both by 
prominent historians and by the work of prosopographers before and during the de-
velopment of PBE, it is striking that most of the prosopographical projects in which 
I have been involved subsequent to PBE are not based on the preparation and presen-
tation of narratives about their historical individuals. Figure 2 gives us an example 
of material available from the Prosopography of Anglo-Saxon England (PASE) about an 
individual named Agemund 1: 
Even at first glance, it is evident that there is no obvious narrative that describes 
what the PASE team knew about this person. Instead, one gets the impression of a list 
of separate small pieces of information. The way to interpret most of it is to see it as 
providing a set of assertions (called “factoids”, of which more later) that the PASE team 
have made about this person. In the area headed “Factoid List” one sees various cate-
gories of assertions listed: Recorded Name (the way the name was written in the primary 
source), Offices (what offices a source document asserted he held) and Events, which are 
further classified here into Charter Witnessing and Grant and Gift. PASE found these 
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particular kinds of assertions about Agemund 1 in the primary sources it read. Other 
entries in PASE have other kinds of assertions as well, and many have a much larger 
set of assertions associated with them. They are always presented in the PASE web ap-
plication as a hierarchically organised list similar to the one shown in Figure 2. 
Below each of the categories of assertions mentioned above, there is a list of 
sources that made them. As it turns out, all the sources for Agemund 1 are charter 
sources (for PASE several thousand sources were read, and about a third of them 
were legal charters), and they all have Sawyer Numbers – the scheme developed by 
Professor Peter Sawyer and published in Anglo-Saxon Charters: an Annotated List and 
Bibliography by the Royal Historical Society in 1968. Thus, all the sources which pro-
vided information about this individual are charters, and have Sawyer Numbers to 
identify them: specifically, S955, S961, S981 and S959. 
The lack of a narrative to describe what is known about the person is one of the 
most striking things that separate PASE (and the other 7 of the prosopographies car-
ried out jointly with historian partners at DDH from the 1990s to the present day) 
Fig. 2: Agemund 1 in the Prosopography of Anglo -Saxon England  
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from PBE and from older published prosopographies. In PASE, there is a one-line 
description associated with all historical persons (and you can see Agemund 1’s as the 
second line of Figure 2) but nothing else with a sense of narrative that describes the 
individual overall. Clearly, PASE and these other prosopographies do not have a nar-
rative as the central part of how an historical person is identified. Instead, the iden-
tity of their historical figures arises from the assembling of these short assertions – 
the factoids. This focus on these relatively simple, brief, assertions has resulted in a 
name for this kind of prosopography: factoid prosopography, which is considered to be 
a specific kind of data-driven prosopography. Data-driven reflects the fact that the re-
search team building them thought of themselves as, most the time, collecting data 
in the form of factoids from their historical sources rather than writing articles about 
the individuals found in them. 
W h a t  K i n d  o f  D a t a ?  
The reader might note the use of the word “data” here. This is a word that has a broad 
range of meanings, and I am using it in a particular way here that needs to be picked 
apart from other meanings. 
First, we can find the word “data” used by Lawrence Stone in his 1970 prosopog-
raphy article when he uses the phrase “quantity and quality of the data accumulated 
about the past” (Stone, 1970, p. 58), and elsewhere too. In all the examples of proso-
pographical undertakings that Stone considers, the primary sources are texts: his-
torical sources as prose writings. Here, Stone, is calling these primary textual 
sources as “data”. Writing in 1970, he seems to be clearly using the word in the largely 
pre-computing sense which seems to have been the primary meaning then, as the 
“[t]hing known or granted, assumption or premise from which inferences may be 
drawn” (this definition from the Oxford Concise Dictionary, 6th Edition published in 
1976). By “data” Stone means “text-based information”. Indeed, for almost all the 
“data-driven” prosopographies created by DDH and historian partners, the primary 
sources that have been read are texts too, exactly as they were for Stone. Thus, it is 
not in the nature of the primary sources that these prosopographies differ from what 
Stone had in mind. Instead, it is primarily the generated output from the research 
that is different, and the meaning of the word “data” as it is used in the phrase “data-
driven prosopography” is not to be found in the nature of the primary sources, but in 
the way the work is done on them. 
A second common assumption about materials described as “data” needs to be 
spelled out here too and separated from what is meant by “data” in this article. This is 
the assumption that data must be by its very nature primarily numeric, and is most 
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useful when it can be appropriately given to statistical processes for analysis. Turning 
source materials into numeric material that would be appropriate for statistical analy-
sis which could then inform historical understanding has a long and somewhat cheq-
uered history. A well-known example where many historians believe that a data-sta-
tistical approach went wrong can be found in the study Time on the Cross: The Economics 
of American Negro Slavery by the economists Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, pub-
lished in 1974 (Fogel & Engerman, 1974). According to William Thomas (Thomas, 2004), 
Fogel and Engerman took a limited number of US slave records, did some rudimentary 
statistical processing, and tried to generalise results to make broad historical state-
ments about the nature of slavery in the United States before the civil war. Fogel and 
Engerman’s conclusions seemed to work against the common understandings of many 
historians about slavery in the USA. As a result, Thomas claims that the study “soured 
many American historians on computational methods” (Thomas, 2004, p. 61). He goes 
on to say that “some British historians have viewed computing technology variously as 
the handmaiden of postmodernism, as a witless accomplice in the collapse of narra-
tive, and as the silent killer of history’s obligation to truth and objectivity”. 
Stone is perhaps less extreme in his damnation of statistical-based analysis for 
history than Thomas describes, but he still does seem to connect a data-driven proso-
pography to statistical analysis. As a result he concludes that prosopography through 
statistical data has limitations since “[f]or most social groups in most areas” this ap-
proach “cannot usefully be employed before the explosion of record materials in the 
sixteenth century, caused by […] the growth of the bureaucratic, record-keeping na-
tion state” (Stone, 1971, p. 58). Indeed, sometimes there can be a kind of historic 
source that is best represented as tabular containing columns of numbers that might 
provide the foundation for statistical analysis. In certain cases (perhaps, say, in stud-
ies of historical census data), the material might even be ideal for it. However, for 
most historical textual sources the challenge becomes getting this kind of data out of 
them: finding material that is complete and consistent enough to allow statistical 
approaches to be used appropriately. 
It is striking then that, in contrast, all of DDH’s “structured data” prosopogra-
phies arise out of periods of history where all the primary sources are overwhelm-
ingly textual and are not record-oriented data, and these sources that survive only 
represent a small part – usually the elite – of their society. Thus, the material found 
in the sources for our prosopographies are generally not suitable for statistical ma-
nipulation and, broadly speaking, cannot be represented by principally numeric 
data. Thus, these project’s data is not the same as the numeric kind represented as 
columns of data, apparently meant by both Stone and Thomas when thinking of the 
Time on the Cross project. 
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D a t a  i n  t h e  R e l a t i o n a l  M o d e l  
If this kind of numeric data is not what is meant by the term “data-driven prosopog-
raphies”, as I have used to describe DDH’s prosopographies, what is meant? 
DDH’s prosopographies all have behind their public surfaces what is called a re-
lational database, and relational databases have a particular way of organising the ma-
terials they hold so as to simultaneously (i) allow the digital data to explicitly repre-
sent some aspects of things that exist in the non-digital world in such a way that (ii) 
a large number of different perspectives can be taken on this material. A similar, if 
perhaps more open-ended approach is expressed by the technologies associated with 
what has been called the Semantic Web. 
A relational database such as one behind any of our data-driven prosopogra-
phies has to be designed before it can be used, and this design can usefully be de-
scribed as structured in terms of entities, attributes and relationships, these three words 
being used in a particular disciplined and formal way. The work to sort out what en-
tities, attributes and relationships represent what is needed in a database is called 
“modelling”: 
˗ Data is organised into entities that represent classes of objects that are to be 
represented. For a prosopography, then, one entity type is Person, but there are 
other entity types too, such as Source for the historical sources, or Office for the 
offices that a person could hold in that society. For PASE, there are over 30 en-
tity types. The word “instance” is used for a particular entity. King Harold II (the 
Anglo-Saxon king at the Battle of Hastings) is an instance of a Person entity. 
˗ Entities have attributes that hold information about their instances. For PASE, 
all Persons have a name and number, for example. For King Harold II (1022/3-
66), his attribute Name is recorded as “Harold” and his distinguishing number 
(from other Harolds) is 3. In most databases, many entities have a good number 
of attributes. In PASE, another attribute attached to Person is their sex, e. g. 
“Harold 3’s sex is Male”. 
˗ Entities may relate to each other, so, for instance, there is a relationship be-
tween the historical persons and the historical sources that mention them. 
These relationships are formally defined in the database model. 
All the statements, including those expressing the relationships that one can make 
from such a system, can be expressed only in terms of very simple statements, like 
the one asserting Harold’s maleness. Thus, any kind of richness of expression that a 
data model of this kind has comes not so much from the structural nuance or subtlety 
of any one of them, but from the number of entities, and of the attributes and rela-
tionships between them that can be expressed. This may seem to the reader to be too 
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much of a compromise to suit the challenges of expressing things about history, and 
we will return later in this paper to this question briefly to suggest why it worked as 
well as it did for our prosopographies. 
S e m a n t i c s  
This is, of course, just a very brief overview of how one needs to think when doing 
the modelling work involved in the creation of a database such as the one that stores 
materials for PASE. The important thing here for the argument in this paper is this: 
the model for a database, to be most useful, has to have a structure that corresponds 
to those things, and aspects of those things, that it is representing in the world. Many 
database designers use the word “semantics” to represent this relationship between 
the database and the world they are modelling. There are two different kinds, or lev-
els, of semantics here. First, there is the semantics that describes how to define en-
tities, attributes and relationships, and what the use of these definitions causes the 
digital technology to do: the semantics of database technology. These semantics ap-
ply to relational databases in general. The second level of semantics, and the one 
more interesting to us here, arises when a particular database has been modelled, 
and it describes the connection the particular entities, attributes and relationships 
have to those aspects of the world that are being represented. 
Here, as is so often the case when a word first developed elsewhere is brought in 
to apply to something in computing, the word “semantics” has a related, but also 
somewhat different, meaning from the linguistic and philosophical world where the 
word is often seen. In those fields, the word semantics is generally tied to natural lan-
guage: the languages that humans speak, or read and write (and perhaps in which 
they even think). As the prominent American philosopher Jerry Fodor said, in an in-
terview in ReVEL magazine, right at the very beginning, about the significance of se-
mantics in philosophy: 
Semantics [..] is part of a grammar of [a] language. In particular, it’s the part of a gram-
mar that is concerned with the relations between symbols in the language and the things 
in the world that they refer to or are true of. […] The intuition is that […] semantics is 
about how they relate to their referents in the nonlinguistic world. (Fodor, 2007, p. 1) 
Fodor’s semantics is about how words and structures in language relate and connect to 
the “nonlinguistic world”. He frames a meaning for the word semantics by tying it to 
natural language, and thus for him the study of semantics comes out of linguistic stud-
ies. Later, he explores the idea that semantics is about a representation of the world: 
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Perhaps the most important thing to understand about the cognitive mind is that it is 
somehow able to represent the world. What makes that so important is that, all else 
equal, how one acts is determined by how one represents the world (rather than by how 
the world actually is.) (Fodor, 2007, p. 4) 
He claims to abhor what he calls the “fashionable post-Modern relativism about 
truth, knowledge and the like” and is not willing to say that “there is ‘nothing beyond 
the text’” (Fodor, 2007, p. 7). To Fodor, our concepts about the world are constrained 
not only by their relations to one another in the mind, but also by their relationship 
to the world outside ourselves. 
The use of the word semantics for the work of database modelling that was de-
scribed earlier shares the idea of connection with things in the world, but, unlike 
Fodor, who is apparently interested in how semantics determines how one repre-
sents the world within the framework of natural language, the semantics in the da-
tabase is not filtered through natural language as its expression. Thus, we have a 
kind of borrowing of a term that arose in one context for a slightly different one. 
What is meant by semantics in database modelling is not so much about written or 
spoken language. Instead, there is a pragmatic interest in applying the entity/at-
tribute/relationship concepts in the model so that everyone involved in the design 
and use of the database agrees that, to the best extent possible, the structures they 
create mirror a representation to aspects of things in the non-digital world. There is 
in fact a common understanding between database developers (and in the so-called 
Semantic Web too) that the semantics behind a database’s structures are also con-
cerned with the relationship between them and “the things in the world that they 
refer to or are true of”, to quote Fodor again. 
Although language syntax is not a part of this database-oriented semantic anal-
ysis, individual words (usually nouns) in a spoken language are used, in that the 
naming of things such as the entities and attributes is part of the design of a data-
base. Both entities and attributes have names, and one uses these names in the da-
tabase model to ground, for the human user, the digital object in its corresponding 
non-digital item. It is the finding of these entities, attributes and relationships, 
naming them, and explicitly mapping them to things with the same names in the 
world that makes database modelling work in ways that are useful. In some sense, 
however, (just as in natural language) syntax provides a framework in which words 
relate to each other and express semantic meaning; the names of components in a 
database design relate to each other through the restricted formalisms of database 
semantics of entity/attribute/relationship and are, perhaps surprisingly, able 
thereby to also express useful things about the world. 
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M o d e l l i n g  H i s t o r y  a n d  H i s t o r i c a l  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  
The reason why this kind of database modelling served the interests of our historians 
is that the entities that were detected in the sources were not only those that are ob-
viously a part of the historical world such as People, Sources, etc. but included enti-
ties that connected their historical understanding of this historical world. This is where 
the idea of Factoids and Factoid Prosopography arose (cf. Bradley, 2016, web page 
“What is Factoid Prosopography all about?”). As this website says, “[a] factoid is a 
spot in a source that says something about a person or persons”. In the factoid pros-
opography approach, an historical source is treated as a source for assertions, made 
by the source, about persons. The ironic character of the name “factoid” is inten-
tional: each factoid records that a source makes a statement (not necessarily now 
thought of as “true”) about a person. While creating factoids, then, the historian’s 
interpretation is always focused on the individual source he or she is reading: “what 
is this source saying about this person or these persons in this spot in the source”. It 
is through the formalism of factoids that the connection between historical sources 
as text and historical people became modelled as data. This article will turn to how 
factoids might contribute to the issue of historical personal identity shortly. First, 
however, the important point here is that the factoid, as one of the semantic entities 
provided in the factoid prosopography model, represents the part of “the world of 
the historian” that sits somewhere between the historical world and the historians 
interpretation of it. Furthermore, the name supports the idea that the “world” being 
represented here is not simply an “objective” historical world of, say, the Roman Re-
public or Medieval Scotland. Instead, it is the more complex world of the historian, 
with their interpretations of what the sources mean blended with this historic, now 
inaccessible, world. It also, at least in part, addresses the concern that the apparently 
simple formalisms of structured data enforce a positivism-oriented view on the data. 
Factoids are not facts; they are creations of historians as a result of their interpreta-
tion of their sources. 
C h a l l e n g i n g  “ M e t a p h o r i c a l  N a r r a t i v i s m ”  
Historical personal identity that emerges from a collection of factoids that are asso-
ciated with an historical person, as we have seen in PASE’s Agemund 1, provides an 
interesting response to Alfred Louch’s claim, mentioned earlier, that “the technique 
of narrative” is “essential to the business of historical explanation” (Louch, 1969, 
p. 54). Louch is writing at roughly the time of the work of prominent history theorist 
Hayden White (and subsequently, Frank Ankersmit). Years later, in 1998, the history 
theorist Chris Lorenz wrote a critique of some of White’s observations (cf. Lorenz, 
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1998) focusing on what he calls their “metaphorical narrativism” model, where “the 
narrative form of history implies that the notion of truth as correspondence cannot 
be applied to historical stories in contrast with the individual statements that collec-
tively make up these stories” (Lorenz, 1998, p. 310). Shortly thereafter, Lorenz claims 
that for White “the plot-structure of narratives” means that historical narratives 
should be interpreted as an “extended metaphor”: it is the historian who “imposes a 
linguistic, literary structure on the past” – even though in that past “nothing real cor-
responds to it” (Lorenz, 1998, p. 331). In the associated footnote he notes the differ-
ence between lives and stories: “Lives are lived and stories are told”. Thus, Lorenz 
says, “stories about lives must be structurally different from the lives themselves and 
can’t be realistically ‘copied’ in the story form”. 
The advantage of the factoid approach, then, might be that it retains a set of low-
level, close-to-the-source, historical assertions (even then, calling them ironically “fac-
toids”, and recognising that they are interpretations), while avoiding the narrative-ori-
ented construction of a higher-level “story” of the person’s life, which requires a higher 
level of interpretation, and is thereby subject to a more subjective rather than objective 
expression. In the factoid prosopographies, the historians were deriving historical as-
sertions from the texts they found in their historical sources, and they were associating 
these assertion-factoids with their sense of named, historical persons, but they were 
not then turning these collections of factoids into stories or narratives that attempted 
to turn these collections into historical lives. They thus largely avoid both of the prob-
lems that Lorenz finds with White’s interpretation of conventional historical writing, 
which is that, in the writing of these historical narratives, 
[n]either at the level of individual descriptive statements nor at the level of the narrative 
organization of those statements is it possible to disentangle the referential, descriptive 
from the metaphorical, point-of-view function, because all linguistic representations of 
reality at the same time constitute points of view at reality, recognized as such or not. 
(Lorenz, 1998, p. 325) 
Lorenz does contest the idea that even individual statements about historical per-
sons – here the factoids – are guaranteed, as it were, to be true: “... the idea that the 
truth of individual statements […] is self-evident and beyond debate […] cannot be 
upheld. At both levels the establishment of truth and falsity is dependent on fallible, 
intersubjective conventions” (Lorenz, 1998, p. 324). However, the factoid assertions, 
although created by the modern day historians of our prosopographical projects and 
therefore a modern interpretation of the text in the sources, seems to be accepted by 
many historians who have commented on the factoid model as, at least potentially, 
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close to “facts” as one can expect from historical sources. Lorenz’s concerns are at 
least apparently reduced to a kind of minimum by this approach. 
As I wrote elsewhere “historical persons survive for us through their appearance 
in sources, and historians identify them not only by their name, but also by what they 
did and by other ways that they are described” (Bradley, 2014, slide 6). This statement 
is relevant to traditional narrative-oriented prosopography of course. Nonetheless, it 
seems to me that the list of factoids in displays like PASE’s Agemund 1 also generates a 
sense of historical identity for this individual, and that hence the work of assembling 
the factoids into historical, named, individuals constitutes assertions about that per-
son’s identity. With factoids the historians are asserting something about who these 
people were, even though the nature of these assertions is somewhat different from 
what would appear if the people had been presented through articles. 
Furthermore, a collection of factoids form a claim by the historians for the iden-
tity of each historical person, and such a collection is still contestable by other histo-
rians – just as people defined in narrative articles must be. It is through this contest-
ability that a sense of “truth” for the assertion of identity arises. Lorenz notes: 
The complexity of the notion of truth in the case of narratives […] cannot be used as an argu-
ment against it, for as long as we presuppose that historical narratives refer to a real past and 
thus represent knowledge of the past, historical narratives constitute truth-claims that must 
be elucidated and not annihilated by philosophy of history. (Lorenz, 1998, p. 326) 
Although arguably closer to the historical sources from which they are derived than 
an article about a person would be, the collection-of-factoids data approach estab-
lishes a connection with Lorenz’s sense of truth: the factoids are not meant to be read 
as facts, but when assembled into people, they still represent a “truth-claim” about 
the existence and nature of these historical individuals. Even though this expression 
is somewhat different in nature from the traditional history as narrative, these data-
oriented prosopographies still represent an attempt to link the historical sources to 
a “real past” even though this can only be viewed through the glass dimly. 
It is, of course, impossible to establish objectively how well our factoid-based 
prosopographies fit with good historical practice. Even so, it seems that our histo-
rian partners have, in general, been satisfied with their expressiveness. From time 
to time we hear from someone who tells us that they have been valuable to their own 
research. Thus, there is reason to think that this non-narrative approach to proso-
pography works well. They challenge the position of theorists such as Louch, Stone, 
White and Ankersmit that of necessity all historical work must be presented in nar-
rative form. The approach to data we used to support these prosopographies, based 
118 John Bradley 
 
on the well-established entity/attribute/relationship approach of the relational data-
base (and in the Semantic Web and Linked Open Data context too), has demon-
strated that it has the semantic potential to represent usefully some aspects of the 
world, even though it is not founded on a linguistic-driven sense of semantics de-
scribed by Fodor. Furthermore, when a model developed (like the factoid approach) 
includes not only an attempt to represent the historical world, but also some aspects 
of the world of scholarship about that world, the approach can create a useful repre-
sentation that can reflect historical, humanities-oriented scholarship. 
Obviously, this approach cannot be extended to a claim that all historical re-
search can be represented without the need for narrative. Indeed, a claim might be 
well made that this approach only suits a small amount of what constitutes historical 
scholarly work. Even so, the data modelling approach when applied to an historical 
research agenda, suggests that there might well be, at least sometimes, a place for 
recognising that there are mental structures that are not narrative in nature and sit 
between the historian’s view of their historical period of study and the prose text that 
they might eventually create to describe them. 
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